arXiv · 0704.2324
Collective states in social systems with interacting learning agents
Abstract
We consider a social system of interacting heterogeneous agents with learning abilities, a model close to Random Field Ising Models, where the random field corresponds to the idiosyncratic willingness to pay. Given a fixed price, agents decide repeatedly whether to buy or not a unit of a good, so as to maximize their expected utilities. We show that the equilibrium reached by the system depends on the nature of the information agents use to estimate their expected utilities.
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Viktoriya Semeshenko, Mirta B. Gordon, Jean-Pierre Nadal. 2007-04-18. Collective states in social systems with interacting learning agents. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2008.04.019
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