arXiv · 0801.3669
Merkle's Key Agreement Protocol is Optimal: An $O(n^2)$ Attack on any Key Agreement from Random Oracles
Abstract
We prove that every key agreement protocol in the random oracle model in which the honest users make at most $n$ queries to the oracle can be broken by an adversary who makes $O(n^2)$ queries to the oracle. This improves on the previous $\widetilde{\Omega}(n^6)$ query attack given by Impagliazzo and Rudich (STOC '89) and resolves an open question posed by them. Our bound is optimal up to a constant factor since Merkle proposed a key agreement protocol in 1974 that can be easily implemented with $n$ queries to a random oracle and cannot be broken by any adversary who asks $o(n^2)$ queries.
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Boaz Barak, Mohammad Mahmoody. 2008-01-23. Merkle's Key Agreement Protocol is Optimal: An $O(n^2)$ Attack on any Key Agreement from Random Oracles. https://arxiv.org/abs/0801.3669
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