arXiv · 0803.0630
The Theory of Fallible Probability and The Dynamics of Degrees of Belief
Abstract
This monograph is an account of the theory of fallible probability and of the dynamics of degrees of belief. It discusses the first order subjective theory in which first order degrees of belief are expressed by subjective probabilities and are updated by conditionalization (Bayes, 1764; Ramsey, 1926), gives an improved exposition of the greater part of the author's theory of Probability Dynamics (Nathan, 2006) which should replace the so-called Probability Kinematics (Jeffrey, 1965), resolves the problem of New Explanation of Old Evidence (Jeffrey, 1995), provides a Theory of Confirmation, and refutes the Principle of Reflection (Van Fraassen, 1984).
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Amos Nathan. 2008-03-05. The Theory of Fallible Probability and The Dynamics of Degrees of Belief. https://arxiv.org/abs/0803.0630
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