arXiv · 0807.0767
Security of quantum key distribution with bit and basis dependent detector flaws
Abstract
We consider the security of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol for Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), in the presence of bit and basis dependent detector flaws. We suggest a powerful attack that can be used in systems with detector efficiency mismatch, even if the detector assignments are chosen randomly by Bob. A security proof is provided, valid for any basis dependent, possibly lossy, linear optical imperfections in the channel/receiver/detectors. The proof does not assume the so-called squashing detector model.
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L. Lydersen, J. Skaar. 2010-01-04. Security of quantum key distribution with bit and basis dependent detector flaws. https://arxiv.org/abs/0807.0767
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