arXiv · 0901.1923
Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game in Random Scale-Free Graphs
Abstract
In this paper we study the cooperative behavior of agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game in random scale-free networks. We show that the survival of cooperation is enhanced with respect to random homogeneous graphs but, on the other hand, decreases when compared to that found in Barabási-Albert scale-free networks. We show that the latter decrease is related with the structure of cooperation. Additionally, we present a mean field approximation for studying evolutionary dynamics in networks with no degree-degree correlations and with arbitrary degree distribution. The mean field approach is similar to the one used for describing the disease spreading in complex networks, making a further compartmentalization of the strategists partition into degree-classes. We show that this kind of approximation is suitable to describe the behavior of the system for a particular set of initial conditions, such as the placement of cooperators in the higher-degree classes, while it fails to reproduce the level of cooperation observed in the numerical simulations for arbitrary initial configurations.
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J. Poncela, J. Gomez-Gardenes, Y. Moreno, L. M. Floria. 2009-01-14. Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game in Random Scale-Free Graphs. https://doi.org/10.1142/s0218127410026137
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