arXiv · 0908.4467
Time averages, recurrence and transience in the stochastic replicator dynamics
Abstract
We investigate the long-run behavior of a stochastic replicator process, which describes game dynamics for a symmetric two-player game under aggregate shocks. We establish an averaging principle that relates time averages of the process and Nash equilibria of a suitably modified game. Furthermore, a sufficient condition for transience is given in terms of mixed equilibria and definiteness of the payoff matrix. We also present necessary and sufficient conditions for stochastic stability of pure equilibria.
Explore related subjects
Keep this discovery
Josef Hofbauer, Lorens A. Imhof. 2009-08-31. Time averages, recurrence and transience in the stochastic replicator dynamics. https://doi.org/10.1214/08-aap577
Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.