arXiv · 0911.3246
Borel Games with Lower-Semi-Continuous Payoffs
Abstract
We prove that every two-player non-zero-sum Borel game with lower-semi-continuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect $\ep$-equilibrium. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille (2003), which shows that a subgame-perfect $\ep$-equilibrium need not exists when the payoffs are not lower-semi-continuous.
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Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi, Eilon Solan. 2009-11-17. Borel Games with Lower-Semi-Continuous Payoffs. https://arxiv.org/abs/0911.3246
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