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arXiv · 1007.4427

Strategic Information Exchange

Dinah Rosenberg·Eilon Solan·Nicolas Vieille
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Abstract

We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated play. The payoff of each player only depends on his `own' state and on his own action. We study to what extent, and how, information can be exchanged in equilibrium. We prove that provided the private information of each player is valuable for the other player, the set of sequential equilibrium payoffs converges to the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs as players become patient.

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Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille. 2010-07-26. Strategic Information Exchange. https://arxiv.org/abs/1007.4427

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