arXiv · 1009.6130
Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on Quantum Cryptography
Abstract
We show the detector blinding attack by Lydersen et al [1] will be ineffective on most single photon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) and certainly ineffective on any detectors that are operated correctly. The attack is only successful if a redundant resistor is included in series with the APD, or if the detector discrimination levels are set inappropriately.
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Z L Yuan, J F Dynes, A J Shields. 2010-09-30. Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on Quantum Cryptography. https://doi.org/10.1038/nphoton.2010.269
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