arXiv · 1109.4335
Social choice rules driven by propositional logic
Abstract
Several rules for social choice are examined from a unifying point of view that looks at them as procedures for revising a system of degrees of belief in accordance with certain specified logical constraints. Belief is here a social attribute, its degrees being measured by the fraction of people who share a given opinion. Different known rules and some new ones are obtained depending on which particular constraints are assumed. These constraints allow to model different notions of choiceness. In particular, we give a new method to deal with approval-disapproval-preferential voting.
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Rosa Camps, Xavier Mora, Laia Saumell. 2015-05-05. Social choice rules driven by propositional logic. https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.4335
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