arXiv · 1203.3051
Combining Voting Rules Together
Abstract
We propose a simple method for combining together voting rules that performs a run-off between the different winners of each voting rule. We prove that this combinator has several good properties. For instance, even if just one of the base voting rules has a desirable property like Condorcet consistency, the combination inherits this property. In addition, we prove that combining voting rules together in this way can make finding a manipulation more computationally difficult. Finally, we study the impact of this combinator on approximation methods that find close to optimal manipulations.
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Nina Narodytska, Toby Walsh, Lirong Xia. 2012-03-14. Combining Voting Rules Together. https://arxiv.org/abs/1203.3051
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