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arXiv · 1207.4044

Designing Information Revelation and Intervention with an Application to Flow Control

Luca Canzian·Yuanzhang Xiao·William Zame·Michele Zorzi·Mihaela van der Schaar
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Abstract

There are many familiar situations in which a manager seeks to design a system in which users share a resource, but outcomes depend on the information held and actions taken by users. If communication is possible, the manager can ask users to report their private information and then, using this information, instruct them on what actions they should take. If the users are compliant, this reduces the manager's optimization problem to a well-studied problem of optimal control. However, if the users are self-interested and not compliant, the problem is much more complicated: when asked to report their private information, the users might lie; upon receiving instructions, the users might disobey. Here we ask whether the manager can design the system to get around both of these difficulties. To do so, the manager must provide for the users the incentives to report truthfully and to follow the instructions, despite the fact that the users are self-interested. For a class of environments that includes many resource allocation games in communication networks, we provide tools for the manager to design an efficient system. In addition to reports and recommendations, the design we employ allows the manager to intervene in the system after the users take actions. In an abstracted environment, we find conditions under which the manager can achieve the same outcome it could if users were compliant, and conditions under which it does not. We then apply our framework and results to design a flow control management system.

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Luca Canzian, Yuanzhang Xiao, William Zame, Michele Zorzi, Mihaela van der Schaar. 2012-07-17. Designing Information Revelation and Intervention with an Application to Flow Control. https://arxiv.org/abs/1207.4044

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