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arXiv · 1208.3160

Multiplicative Updates in Coordination Games and the Theory of Evolution

Erick Chastain·Adi Livnat·Christos Papadimitriou·Umesh Vazirani
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Abstract

We study the population genetics of Evolution in the important special case of weak selection, in which all fitness values are assumed to be close to one another. We show that in this regime natural selection is tantamount to the multiplicative updates game dynamics in a coordination game between genes. Importantly, the utility maximized in this game, as well as the amount by which each allele is boosted, is precisely the allele's mixability, or average fitness, a quantity recently proposed in [1] as a novel concept that is crucial in understanding natural selection under sex, thus providing a rigorous demonstration of that insight. We also prove that the equilibria in two-person coordination games can have large supports, and thus genetic diversity does not suffer much at equilibrium. Establishing large supports involves answering through a novel technique the following question: what is the probability that for a random square matrix A both systems Ax = 1 and A^T y = 1 have positive solutions? Both the question and the technique may be of broader interest. [1] A. Livnat, C. Papadimitriou, J. Dushoff, and M.W. Feldman. A mixability theory for the role of sex in evolution. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105(50):19803-19808, 2008.

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Erick Chastain, Adi Livnat, Christos Papadimitriou, Umesh Vazirani. 2012-08-15. Multiplicative Updates in Coordination Games and the Theory of Evolution. https://arxiv.org/abs/1208.3160

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