arXiv · 1303.1517
Belief Revision in Probability Theory
Abstract
In a probability-based reasoning system, Bayes' theorem and its variations are often used to revise the system's beliefs. However, if the explicit conditions and the implicit conditions of probability assignments `me properly distinguished, it follows that Bayes' theorem is not a generally applicable revision rule. Upon properly distinguishing belief revision from belief updating, we see that Jeffrey's rule and its variations are not revision rules, either. Without these distinctions, the limitation of the Bayesian approach is often ignored or underestimated. Revision, in its general form, cannot be done in the Bayesian approach, because a probability distribution function alone does not contain the information needed by the operation.
Explore related subjects
Keep this discovery
Pei Wang. 2013-03-06. Belief Revision in Probability Theory. https://arxiv.org/abs/1303.1517
Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.