arXiv · 1307.5756
DNStamp: Short-lived Trusted Timestamping
Abstract
Trusted timestamping consists in proving that certain data existed at a particular point in time. Existing timestamping methods require either a centralized and dedicated trusted service or the collaboration of other participants using the timestamping service. We propose a novel trusted timestamping scheme, called DNStamp, that does not require a dedicated service nor collaboration between participants. DNStamp produces shortlived timestamps with a validity period of several days. The generation and verification involves a large number of Domain Name System cache resolvers, thus removing any single point of failure and any single point of trust. Any host with Internet access may request or verify a timestamp, with no need to register to any timestamping service. We provide a full description and analysis of DNStamp. We analyze the security against various adversaries and show resistance to forward-dating, back-dating and erasure attacks. Experiments with our implementation of DNStamp show that one can set and then reliably verify timestamps even under continuous attack conditions.
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Christoph Neumann, Olivier Heen, Stéphane Onno. 2014-03-11. DNStamp: Short-lived Trusted Timestamping. https://arxiv.org/abs/1307.5756
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