Searcharxiv⌕ Search
Home/Archive/arXiv

arXiv · 1308.3185

To Relay or Not to Relay: Learning Device-to-Device Relaying Strategies in Cellular Networks

Nicholas Mastronarde·Viral Patel·Jie Xu·Lingjia Liu·Mihaela van der Schaar
View original source ↗Read source document ↗Export metadata ↓

Abstract

We consider a cellular network where mobile transceiver devices that are owned by self-interested users are incentivized to cooperate with each other using tokens, which they exchange electronically to "buy" and "sell" downlink relay services, thereby increasing the network's capacity compared to a network that only supports base station-to-device (B2D) communications. We investigate how an individual device in the network can learn its optimal cooperation policy online, which it uses to decide whether or not to provide downlink relay services for other devices in exchange for tokens. We propose a supervised learning algorithm that devices can deploy to learn their optimal cooperation strategies online given their experienced network environment. We then systematically evaluate the learning algorithm in various deployment scenarios. Our simulation results suggest that devices have the greatest incentive to cooperate when the network contains (i) many devices with high energy budgets for relaying, (ii) many highly mobile users (e.g., users in motor vehicles), and (iii) neither too few nor too many tokens. Additionally, within the token system, self-interested devices can effectively learn to cooperate online, and achieve over 20% higher throughput on average than with B2D communications alone, all while selfishly maximizing their own utilities.

Explore related subjects

cs.GTcs.MAcs.NI

Keep this discovery

BibTeXRIS

Nicholas Mastronarde, Viral Patel, Jie Xu, Lingjia Liu, Mihaela van der Schaar. 2013-06-05. To Relay or Not to Relay: Learning Device-to-Device Relaying Strategies in Cellular Networks. https://arxiv.org/abs/1308.3185

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

arXiv2026

MMS Allocation for Chores with Online Agent Arrivals

We study the fair allocation of $m$ indivisible chores to $n$ agents with subadditive cost functions arriving online in an arbitrary order. Upon an agent's arrival, we are informed of her cost function and must irrevocably assign her a set of chores. We focus on the Maximin Share (MMS) fairness notion and aim to compute an allocation in which all items are assigned, and no agent incurs a cost more than $\alpha$ times her MMS. Without any prior information about the instance (other than $n$ and $m$), we design an algorithm with a competitive ratio of $O(\min\{n, k\log^{1+\epsilon}k, \log m\})$ for any constant $\epsilon > 0$, where $k$ denotes the number of cost function types. Our bound matches the best known offline approximation guarantees for MMS under subadditive costs and is nearly optimal with respect to all three parameters: we show that even for binary additive cost functions, no online algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio of $o(\min\{n, k\log k, \log m\})$. We then consider the setting in which the $k$ cost function types are known in advance (though the realized types of arriving agents are not). For additive cost functions, we provide an algorithm with a competitive ratio of $O(\min\{\log k, \log(kn)/\log\log(kn)\})$, and show that constant-competitive algorithms do not exist for general $k$, even for the binary additive setting. For binary additive functions when $k \le n$, we propose a $3$-competitive algorithm and establish a lower bound of $2$.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2026

Truncated Noisy Best-Response Algorithms: Toward Game Theoretic Learning with Safety Guarantees

We consider a game theoretic approach to solve multi-agent coordination problems with submodular maximization objectives. It is known for such problems that the Nash equilibria for the corresponding game are always within 50% of the optimal, but that the equilibria which achieve this worst-case bound are not stable. To exploit this instability, we propose a family of algorithms which we call Truncated Noisy Best-Response (TNBR) Algorithms. These algorithms are flexibly characterized by agents asynchronously and stochastically selecting actions from a neighbourhood of their best response payoffs. We compute bounds on the recurrent classes of TNBR algorithms' associated Markov chains. Our bounds fall into two categories: first, "Performance" bounds ensure that TNBR algorithms always have a high-value recurrent state; second, "Safety" bounds ensure that TNBR algorithms never have arbitrarily-bad recurrent states. Furthermore, these two types of bounds are linked by a waterbed-like effect: every game with a poor Safety guarantee necessarily has a favorable Performance guarantee.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2026

Existence of the Core in Approval-Based Committee Elections

We settle the main open question in the theory of approval-based multi-winner elections: we show that there always exists a committee in the core. The core is a stability and group fairness concept. The proof introduces a new voting rule that optimizes an entropy-like objective function over committees and payment systems. All local optima of this objective function lie in the core, which implies that a core committee can be found in polynomial time.

cs.GT↗