SearcharxivSearch

arXiv · 1312.4381

A machine-assisted view of paraconsistency

Abstract

For a newcomer, paraconsistent logics can be difficult to grasp. Even experts in logic can find the concept of paraconsistency to be suspicious or misguided, if not actually wrong. The problem is that although they usually have much in common with more familiar logics (such as intuitionistic or classical logic), paraconsistent logics necessarily disagree in other parts of the logical terrain which one might have thought were not up for debate. Thus, one's logical intuitions may need to be recalibrated to work skillfully with paraconsistency. To get started, one should clearly appreciate the possibility of paraconsistent logics and the genuineness of the distinctions to which paraconsistency points. For this purpose, one typically encounters matrices involving more than two truth values to characterize suitable consequence relations. In the eyes of a two-valued skeptic, such an approach might seem dubious. Even a non-skeptic might wonder if there's another way. To this end, to explore the basic notions of paraconsistent logic with the assistance of automated reasoning techniques. Such an approach has merit because by delegating some of the logical work to a machine, one's logical "biases" become externalized. The result is a new way to appreciate that the distinctions to which paraconsistent logic points are indeed genuine. Our approach can even suggest new questions and problems for the paraconsistent logic community.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

BibTeXRIS

Jesse Alama. 2013-12-16. A machine-assisted view of paraconsistency. https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.4381

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

There is no maximal $K$-degree

The Kolmogorov complexity of a string characterize how complex it is to describe the string. If every prefix of a real $x$ is more complex to describe than every prefix (of the same length) of real $y$, then it is seen as $x$ is more complex to describe than $y$. It is wondered if there is a real $x$ so that no other reals are strictly more complex (to describe) than $x$. The behavior of Kolmogorov complexity functions generated by reals (namely $n\mapsto$ the minimal description length of the real) is quite chaos. Therefore, it is widely believed that there are many reals that are maximally complex to describe. For instance, it is conjectured that all random enough reals have maximal $K$-degree. In this paper, it is shown that there is no real with maximal $K$-degree. Actually, for almost all real $x$, we can uniformly computably find another real whose $K$-degree is strictly above $x$.

math.LO

Quadruples and cubes

We prove, in $\mathsf{ZFC}$, that the $\lambda$-terraced cube relation fails whenever $\lambda$ is an uncountable cardinal. The corresponding terraced relation for quadruples fails for every $\lambda$. If $\lambda$ is $\aleph_0$ then the pretinent terraced relation has consistency strength of at least one Woodin cardinal. We prove positive polarized relations at a successor and a double successor from wondrous ideals. We show, however, that there are no such ideals over two consecutive cardinals simultaneously.

math.LO

Possibilistic Logic over a Logic of Formal Inconsistency

In this article, we have introduced a new possibilistic logic on a logic of formal inconsistency with the aim of developing a possibility theoretic framework to deal with uncertainty and inconsistency meaningfully without leading to a system collapse. We have discussed the syntax and semantics for this logic and have proved the soundness and completeness theorems. A set of new measures of consistency, contradictoriness, and triviality of a set of formulas have been defined. These have then been put to use in an example to show that this framework can provide better means of machine reasoning.

math.LO