arXiv · 1403.1385
Dynamical Analysis of a Repeated Game with Incomplete Information
Abstract
We study a two player repeated zero-sum game with asymmetric information introduced by Renault in which the underlying state of the game undergoes Markov evolution (parameterized by a transition probability $\frac 12\le p\le 1$). H\"orner, Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille identified an optimal strategy, $\sigma^*$ for the informed player for $p$ in the range $[\frac 12,\frac 23]$. We extend the range on which $\sigma^*$ is proved to be optimal to about $[\frac 12,0.719]$ and prove that it fails to be optimal at a value around 0.7328. Our techniques make use of tools from dynamical systems, specifically the notion of pressure, introduced by D. Ruelle.
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Xavier Bressaud, Anthony Quas. 2014-03-06. Dynamical Analysis of a Repeated Game with Incomplete Information. https://arxiv.org/abs/1403.1385
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