arXiv · 1503.01802
Game-theoretic approach to risk-sensitive benchmarked asset management
Abstract
In this article we consider a game theoretic approach to the Risk-Sensitive Benchmarked Asset Management problem (RSBAM) of Davis and Lleo \cite{DL}. In particular, we consider a stochastic differential game between two players, namely, the investor who has a power utility while the second player represents the market which tries to minimize the expected payoff of the investor. The market does this by modulating a stochastic benchmark that the investor needs to outperform. We obtain an explicit expression for the optimal pair of strategies as for both the players.
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Amogh Deshpande, Saul D. Jacka. 2015-03-05. Game-theoretic approach to risk-sensitive benchmarked asset management. https://arxiv.org/abs/1503.01802
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