arXiv · 1508.03989
Nash equilibria of threshold type for two-player nonzero-sum games of stopping
Abstract
This paper analyses two-player nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping on a class of linear regular diffusions with not non-singular boundary behaviour (in the sense of It\^o and McKean (1974), p.\ 108). We provide sufficient conditions under which Nash equilibria are realised by each player stopping the diffusion at one of the two boundary points of an interval. The boundaries of this interval solve a system of algebraic equations. We also provide conditions sufficient for the uniqueness of the equilibrium in this class.
Explore related subjects
Keep this discovery
Tiziano De Angelis, Giorgio Ferrari, John Moriarty. 2015-08-17. Nash equilibria of threshold type for two-player nonzero-sum games of stopping. https://arxiv.org/abs/1508.03989
Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.