SearcharxivSearch

arXiv · 1611.09983

Anticipating Moves to Prevent Botnet Generated DDoS Flooding Attacks

Abstract

Volumetric Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have been a recurrent issue on the Internet. These attacks generate a flooding of fake network traffic to interfere with targeted servers or network links. Despite many efforts to detect and mitigate them, attackers have played a game always circumventing countermeasures. Today, there is an increase in the number of infected devices, even more with the advent of the Internet of Things and flexible communication technologies. Leveraging device-to-device short range wireless communications and others, infected devices can coordinate sophisticated botnets, which can be employed to intensify DDoS attacks. The new generation of botnets is even harder to detect because of their adaptive and dynamic behavior yielded by infected mobile portable devices. Additionally, because there can be a large number of geographically distributed devices, botnets increase DDoS traffic significantly. In face of their new behavior and the increasing volume of DDoS traffic, novel and intelligent-driven approaches are required. Specifically, we advocate for {\em anticipating} trends of DDoS attacks in the early stages as much as possible. This work provides an overview of approaches that can be employed to anticipate trends of DDoS attacks generated by botnets in their early stages and brings an insightful discussion about the advantages of each kind of approach and open issues.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

BibTeXRIS

Michele Nogueira. 2016-11-30. Anticipating Moves to Prevent Botnet Generated DDoS Flooding Attacks. https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.09983

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Message-Level Scheduling for RLNC-Coded Multi-Source Traffic

This paper studies weighted decoding-delay minimization for multiple RLNC-coded message streams that compete for finite processing capacity at a destination. Packet arrivals are exogenous, while the scheduler only determines the processing order of packets already available at the destination. A trace-conditioned offline scheduling formulation shows that a batch-release subclass is strongly NP-hard even with a single processing unit. Message-Aware Innovation-Deficit Scheduling (MAIDS) is then developed to prioritize each serviceable message according to its weight and remaining decoding deficit. For a single processing unit, MAIDS is shown to be exactly optimal under nonblocking progressive arrivals with equal weights and under common activation with arbitrary positive weights, while the unrestricted weighted online problem admits no universal deterministic $O(1)$ competitive ratio. Simulation results on streaming and batch benchmarks show that MAIDS consistently reduces weighted decoding delay relative to the tested baselines, remains close to the offline optimum on average, and recovers the predicted exact performance boundaries.

cs.NI

The Towers Were Standing: A Cause Decomposition of Cellular Outages During Hurricane Helene

Hurricane Helene produced the largest absolute cell-site outage in the public FCC record, peaking at 4562 sites. The conventional model is physical: towers destroyed. Helene did destroy over 1700 miles of fibre, but almost none of it was cell sites. We present the first cause-decomposed study of the FCC's Disaster Information Reporting System, reconstructing 80 state-days and 580 county-days from 24 daily filings by two reconciled independent extractions. Damage to cell sites is negligible: 1.1% of attributed cell-site-days across six states, at most 3.8% anywhere. The sites were standing. What took them out divides by terrain: pooled, power dominates at 63.2%, but in mountainous North Carolina severed transport (backhaul) reaches 52.2% against 47.3%, and in Tennessee 69.9%. North Carolina's transport share rises from 7.0% to 85.0% across the event (\r{ho} = 0.92). Seventeen days after landfall, on 15 October, 47 sites lost transport across six contiguous North Carolina counties with no rainfall, no power loss, no damage, and recovery by the next report. Independent active-probe measurement corroborates it: responsive /24s fall 1.02% for twelve hours while Tennessee stays flat. We release the dataset. Backup power is the standard resilience investment; here it addresses the smaller half of the problem.

cs.NI

terms.txt: A Consent and Compensation Protocol for Agentic Web Access

The open web ran on an unwritten bargain: sites admitted crawlers, and search engines sent visitors back. Public measurements show that bargain breaking under AI crawlers and agents. Automated clients now make up most requests, training dominates Cloudflare-classified crawling, and the largest AI platforms fetch thousands of pages for each visitor they return. The web's common control, robots.txt, cannot express identity, purpose, terms, or price, can be circumvented, and newer alternatives are largely proprietary CDN features. We specify terms.txt, a robots.txt-style file for per-path, per-purpose machine-access terms, plus an origin-enforced exchange using Web Bot Auth signatures, signed intent, delegation tokens, HTTP 402 negotiation, and signed receipts. We define what the exchange can enforce, audit, and leave to contract. A dependency-free implementation adds 0.20 to 0.65 ms per request on one vCPU.

cs.NI