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arXiv · 1611.10191

Is Non-Neutrality Profitable for the Stakeholders of the Internet Market?

Mohammad Hassan Lotfi·Saswati Sarkar·George Kesidis
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Abstract

Net neutrality on the Internet is perceived as the policy that mandates Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to treat all data equally, regardless of the source, destination, or type of transmitted data. In this work, we consider a scheme in which the decision makers of the market are two ISPs, one "big" Content Provider (CP), and a continuum of end-users. One of the ISPs is neutral and the other is non-neutral, i.e. she offers a premium quality to a CP in exchange for a side-payment. In addition, we assume that the CP can differentiate between ISPs by controlling the quality of the content she is offering on each one. In this part of the paper, we consider a scenario in which end-users are not locked in with the ISPs and can switch between ISPs easily. We formulate a sequential game, and show that there exists a unique Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) for the game, where the CP pays the side-payment to the non-neutral ISP and offers her content with the premium quality. In addition, the CP does not offer her content on the neutral ISP. Thus, driving this ISP out of the market.

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Mohammad Hassan Lotfi, Saswati Sarkar, George Kesidis. 2016-11-30. Is Non-Neutrality Profitable for the Stakeholders of the Internet Market?. https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.10191

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