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arXiv · 1612.08821

The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders

Alon Eden·Michal Feldman·Ophir Friedler·Inbal Talgam-Cohen·S. Matthew Weinberg
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Abstract

A seminal result of Bulow and Klemperer [1989] demonstrates the power of competition for extracting revenue: when selling a single item to $n$ bidders whose values are drawn i.i.d. from a regular distribution, the simple welfare-maximizing VCG mechanism (in this case, a second price-auction) with one additional bidder extracts at least as much revenue in expectation as the optimal mechanism. The beauty of this theorem stems from the fact that VCG is a {\em prior-independent} mechanism, where the seller possesses no information about the distribution, and yet, by recruiting one additional bidder it performs better than any prior-dependent mechanism tailored exactly to the distribution at hand (without the additional bidder). In this work, we establish the first {\em full Bulow-Klemperer} results in {\em multi-dimensional} environments, proving that by recruiting additional bidders, the revenue of the VCG mechanism surpasses that of the optimal (possibly randomized, Bayesian incentive compatible) mechanism. For a given environment with i.i.d. bidders, we term the number of additional bidders needed to achieve this guarantee the environment's {\em competition complexity}. Using the recent duality-based framework of Cai et al. [2016] for reasoning about optimal revenue, we show that the competition complexity of $n$ bidders with additive valuations over $m$ independent, regular items is at most $n+2m-2$ and at least $\log(m)$. We extend our results to bidders with additive valuations subject to downward-closed constraints, showing that these significantly more general valuations increase the competition complexity by at most an additive $m-1$ factor. We further improve this bound for the special case of matroid constraints, and provide additional extensions as well.

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Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg. 2016-12-28. The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders. https://arxiv.org/abs/1612.08821

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