arXiv · 1705.08160
Evolutionary game of coalition building under external pressure
Abstract
We study the fragmentation-coagulation (or merging and splitting) evolutionary control model as introduced recently by one of the authors, where $N$ small players can form coalitions to resist to the pressure exerted by the principal. It is a Markov chain in continuous time and the players have a common reward to optimize. We study the behavior as $N$ grows and show that the problem converges to a (one player) deterministic optimization problem in continuous time, in the infinite dimensional state space.
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Alekos Cecchin, Vassili N. Kolokoltsov. 2017-05-23. Evolutionary game of coalition building under external pressure. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70619-1_4
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