arXiv · 1707.02598
Quitting Games and Linear Complementarity Problems
Abstract
We prove that every multiplayer quitting game admits a sunspot $\varepsilon$-equilibrium for every $\varepsilon > 0$, that is, an $\varepsilon$-equilibrium in an extended game in which the players observe a public signal at every stage. We also prove that if a certain matrix that is derived from the payoffs in the game is a $Q$-matrix in the sense of linear complementarity problems, then the game admits a Nash $\varepsilon$-equilibrium for every $\varepsilon > 0$.
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Eilon Solan, Omri N. Solan. 2017-07-09. Quitting Games and Linear Complementarity Problems. https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.02598
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