arXiv · 1707.06189
Multistage Voting Model with Alternative Elimination
Abstract
The voting process is formalized as a multistage voting model with successive alternative elimination. A finite number of agents vote for one of the alternatives each round subject to their preferences. If the number of votes given to the alternative is less than a threshold, it gets eliminated from the game. A special subclass of repeated games that always stop after a finite number of stages is considered. Threshold updating rule is proposed. A computer simulation is used to illustrate two properties of these voting games.
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Oleg A. Malafeyev, Denis Rylow, Irina Zaitseva, Anna Ermakova, Dmitry Shlaev. 2017-07-19. Multistage Voting Model with Alternative Elimination. https://doi.org/10.1063/1.5043756
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