Power Diagram Detection with Applications to Information Elicitation

Abstract

Power diagrams, a type of weighted Voronoi diagrams, have many applications throughout operations research. We study the problem of power diagram detection: determining whether a given finite partition of $\mathbb{R}^d$ takes the form of a power diagram. This detection problem is particularly prevalent in the field of information elicitation, where one wishes to design contracts to incentivize self-minded agents to provide honest information. We devise a simple linear program to decide whether a polyhedral cell decomposition can be described as a power diagram. Further, we discuss applications to property elicitation, peer prediction, and mechanism design, where this question arises. Our model is able to efficiently decide the question for decompositions of $\mathbb{R}^d$ or of a restricted domain in $\mathbb{R}^d$. The approach is based on the use of an alternative representation of power diagrams, and invariance of a power diagram under uniform scaling of the parameters in this representation.