arXiv · 1802.01253
Promoting cooperation by reputation-driven group formation
Abstract
In previous studies of spatial public goods game, each player is able to establish a group. However, in real life, some players cannot successfully organize groups for various reasons. In this paper, we propose a mechanism of reputation-driven group formation, in which groups can only be organized by players whose reputation reaches or exceeds a threshold. We define a player's reputation as the frequency of cooperation in the last $T$ time steps. We find that the highest cooperation level can be obtained when groups are only established by pure cooperators who always cooperate in the last $T$ time steps. Effects of the memory length $T$ on cooperation are also studied.
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Han-Xin Yang, Zhen Wang. 2018-02-05. Promoting cooperation by reputation-driven group formation. https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.01253
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