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arXiv · 1802.03805

Quantum mechanics, ontology, and non-reflexive logics

Abstract

This is a general philosophical paper where I overview some ideas concerning the non-reflexive foundations of quantum mechanics (NRFQM). By NRFQM I mean formalism and an interpretation of QM that considers an involved ontology of non-individuals as explained in the text. Thus, I do not endorse a purely instrumentalist view of QM, but believe that it speaks of something, and then I try to show that one of the plausible views of this `something' is as entities devoid of identity conditions. Warning note: This is a revised version of a paper with the same name that was written by invitation to be published in a book titled \textit{The Mammoth Book on Quantum Mechanics Interpretations}, edited by Open Academic Press, Berlin, and having as editor a certain Ulf Edvinsson, who has invited me. The book was announced in the page of OAP and should appear by 2016. This never happened. Later I discovered that OAP is in a list of predatory editorial houses and that "Ulf Edvinsson" is (apparently) a fake name. Furthermore, I couldn't contact anyone responding by OAP to retire my name from the announcement of the book and for impeding them to publish the paper. I strongly apologize for such a fault, which is completely mine. Since the subject presented here has been among my preoccupations ever since I met Franscicso Antonio Doria for the first time (in 1987), it is a pleasure to dedicate the stuff to him. And of course I thank the editors for accepting this version of the paper for this book.

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BibTeXRIS

Decio Krause. 2018-02-11. Quantum mechanics, ontology, and non-reflexive logics. https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.03805

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