arXiv · 1803.06035
Reputation is required for cooperation to emerge in dynamic networks
Abstract
Melamed, Harrell, and Simpson have recently reported on an experiment which appears to show that cooperation can arise in a dynamic network without reputational knowledge, i.e., purely via dynamics [1]. We believe that their experimental design is actually not testing this, in so far as players do know the last action of their current partners before making a choice on their own next action and subsequently deciding which link to cut. Had the authors given no information at all, the result would be a decline in cooperation as shown in [2].
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Jose A. Cuesta, Carlos Gracia-Lázaro, Yamir Moreno, Angel Sánchez. 2018-03-15. Reputation is required for cooperation to emerge in dynamic networks. https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.06035
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