Percolation of Hierarchical Networks and Networks of Networks

Abstract

Much work has been devoted to studying percolation of networks and interdependent networks under varying levels of failures. Researchers have considered many different realistic network structures, but thus far no study has incorporated the hierarchical structure of many networks. For example, infrastructure across cities will likely be distributed such that nodes are tightly connected within small neighborhoods, somewhat less connected across the whole city, and have even fewer connections between cities. Furthermore, while previous work identified interconnected nodes, those nodes with links outside their neighborhood, to be more likely to be attacked, here we have various levels of interconnections (between neighborhoods, between cities, etc.). We consider the nodes with interconnections at the highest level most likely to be attacked, followed by those with interconnections at the next level, etc. We develop an analytic solution for both single and interdependent networks of this structure and verify our theory through simulations. We find that depending on the number of levels in the hierarchy there may be multiple transitions in the giant component (fraction of interconnected nodes), as the network separates at the various levels. Our results show that these multiple jumps are a feature of hierarchical networks and can affect the vulnerability of infrastructure networks.