arXiv · 1806.01072
A rational decentralized generalized Nash equilibrium seeking for energy markets
Abstract
We propose a method to design a decentralized energy market which guarantees individual rationality (IR) in expectation, in the presence of system-level grid constraints. We formulate the market as a welfare maximization problem subject to IR constraints, and we make use of Lagrangian duality to model the problem as a n-person non-cooperative game with a unique generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE). We provide a distributed algorithm which converges to the GNE. The convergence and properties of the algorithm are investigated by means of numerical simulations.
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Lorenzo Nespoli, Matteo Salani, Vasco Medici. 2018-06-04. A rational decentralized generalized Nash equilibrium seeking for energy markets. https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.01072
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