arXiv · 1901.06522
Asymptotic value in frequency-dependent games with separable payoffs: a differential approach
Abstract
We study the asymptotic value of a frequency-dependent zero-sum game with separable payoff following a differential approach. The stage payoffs in such games depend on the current actions and on a linear function of the frequency of actions played so far. We associate to the repeated game, in a natural way, a differential game and although the latter presents an irregularity at the origin, we prove that it has a value. We conclude, using appropriate approximations, that the asymptotic value of the original game exists in both the n-stage and the λ-discounted games and that it coincides with the value of the continuous time game.
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Joseph Abdou, Nikolaos Pnevmatikos. 2019-01-19. Asymptotic value in frequency-dependent games with separable payoffs: a differential approach. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-018-0278-2
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