Hotelling Games with Multiple Line Faults

Avi Cohen; David Peleg

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arXiv · 1907.06602

Hotelling Games with Multiple Line Faults

Avi Cohen·David Peleg

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Abstract

The Hotelling game consists of n servers each choosing a point on the line segment, so as to maximize the amount of clients it attracts. Clients are uniformly distributed along the line, and each client buys from the closest server. In this paper, we study a fault-prone version of the Hotelling game, where the line fails at multiple random locations. Each failure disconnects the line, blocking the passage of clients. We show that the game admits a Nash equilibrium if and only if the rate of faults exceeds a certain threshold, and calculate that threshold approximately. Moreover, when a Nash equilibrium exists we show it is unique and construct it explicitly. Hence, somewhat surprisingly, the potential occurrence of failures has a stabilizing effect on the game (provided there are enough of them). Additionally, we study the social cost of the game (measured in terms of the total transportation cost of the clients), which also seems to benefit in a certain sense from the potential presence of failures.

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BibTeX RIS

Avi Cohen, David Peleg. 2019-07-15. Hotelling Games with Multiple Line Faults. https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.06602

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