arXiv · 1908.01496
Sometime a Paradox, Now Proof: Non-First-Order-izability of Yablo's Paradox
Abstract
Paradoxes are interesting puzzles in philosophy and mathematics, and they could be even more fascinating, when turned into proofs and theorems. For example, Liar's paradox can be translated into a propositional tautology, and Barber's paradox turns into a first-order tautology. Russell's paradox, which collapsed Frege's foundational framework, is now a classical theorem in set theory, implying that no set of all sets can exist. Paradoxes can be used in proofs of some other theorems; Liar's paradox has been used in the classical proof of Tarski's theorem on the undefinability of truth in sufficiently rich languages. This paradox (and also Richard's paradox) appears implicitly in Gödel's proof of his celebrated first incompleteness theorem. In this paper, we study Yablo's paradox from the viewpoint of first and second order logics. We prove that a formalization of Yablo's paradox (which is second-order in nature) is non-first-order-izable in the sense of George Boolos (1984).
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Saeed Salehi. 2020-07-01. Sometime a Paradox, Now Proof: Non-First-Order-izability of Yablo's Paradox. https://doi.org/10.1093/jigpal%2Fjzaa051
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