arXiv · 1909.03616
Formulating Manipulable Argumentation with Intra-/Inter-Agent Preferences
Abstract
From marketing to politics, exploitation of incomplete information through selective communication of arguments is ubiquitous. In this work, we focus on development of an argumentation-theoretic model for manipulable multi-agent argumentation, where each agent may transmit deceptive information to others for tactical motives. In particular, we study characterisation of epistemic states, and their roles in deception/honesty detection and (mis)trust-building. To this end, we propose the use of intra-agent preferences to handle deception/honesty detection and inter-agent preferences to determine which agent(s) to believe in more. We show how deception/honesty in an argumentation of an agent, if detected, would alter the agent's perceived trustworthiness, and how that may affect their judgement as to which arguments should be acceptable.
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Ryuta Arisaka, Makoto Hagiwara, Takayuki Ito. 2019-09-09. Formulating Manipulable Argumentation with Intra-/Inter-Agent Preferences. https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.03616
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