arXiv · 1912.04800
Approximate Strategyproofness in Large, Two-Sided Matching Markets
Abstract
An approximation of strategyproofness in large, two-sided matching markets is highly evident. Through simulations, one can observe that the percentage of agents with useful deviations decreases as the market size grows. Furthermore, there seems to be a strong connection between the length of preference order lists, the correlation of agent preferences, and the approximation of strategyproofness. Interestingly, approximate strategyproofness is reached easier with a shorter length of preference orders and higher preference correlation. These findings justify the use of the deferred acceptance algorithm in large two-sided matching markets despite it not being strategy-proof.
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Lars Lien Ankile, Kjartan Krange, Yuto Yagi. 2019-12-10. Approximate Strategyproofness in Large, Two-Sided Matching Markets. https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.04800
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