SearcharxivSearch

arXiv · 2003.07114

Tameness for set theory $I$

Abstract

The paper is a first of two and aims to show that (assuming large cardinals) set theory is a tractable (and we dare to say tame) first order theory when formalized in a first order signature with natural predicate symbols for the basic definable concepts of second and third order arithmetic, and appealing to the model-theoretic notions of model completeness and model companionship. Specifically we develop a general framework linking generic absoluteness results to model companionship and show that (with the required care in details) a $\Pi_2$-property formalized in an appropriate language for second or third order number theory is forcible from some $T\supseteq\mathsf{ZFC}+$large cardinals if and only if it is consistent with the universal fragment of $T$ if and only if it is realized in the model companion of $T$. The paper is accessible to any person who has a fair acquaintance with set theory and first order logic at the level of an under-graduate course in both topics; however bizarre this may appear (given the results we aim to prove) no knowledge of forcing or large cardinals is required to get the proofs of its main results (if one accepts as black-boxes the relevant generic absoluteness results). On the other hand familiarity with the notions of model completeness and model companionship is essential. All the necessary model-theoretic background will be given in full detail. The present work expands and systematize previous results obtained with Venturi.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

BibTeXRIS

Matteo Viale. 2020-03-16. Tameness for set theory $I$. https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.07114

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

There is no maximal $K$-degree

The Kolmogorov complexity of a string characterize how complex it is to describe the string. If every prefix of a real $x$ is more complex to describe than every prefix (of the same length) of real $y$, then it is seen as $x$ is more complex to describe than $y$. It is wondered if there is a real $x$ so that no other reals are strictly more complex (to describe) than $x$. The behavior of Kolmogorov complexity functions generated by reals (namely $n\mapsto$ the minimal description length of the real) is quite chaos. Therefore, it is widely believed that there are many reals that are maximally complex to describe. For instance, it is conjectured that all random enough reals have maximal $K$-degree. In this paper, it is shown that there is no real with maximal $K$-degree. Actually, for almost all real $x$, we can uniformly computably find another real whose $K$-degree is strictly above $x$.

math.LO

Quadruples and cubes

We prove, in $\mathsf{ZFC}$, that the $\lambda$-terraced cube relation fails whenever $\lambda$ is an uncountable cardinal. The corresponding terraced relation for quadruples fails for every $\lambda$. If $\lambda$ is $\aleph_0$ then the pretinent terraced relation has consistency strength of at least one Woodin cardinal. We prove positive polarized relations at a successor and a double successor from wondrous ideals. We show, however, that there are no such ideals over two consecutive cardinals simultaneously.

math.LO

Possibilistic Logic over a Logic of Formal Inconsistency

In this article, we have introduced a new possibilistic logic on a logic of formal inconsistency with the aim of developing a possibility theoretic framework to deal with uncertainty and inconsistency meaningfully without leading to a system collapse. We have discussed the syntax and semantics for this logic and have proved the soundness and completeness theorems. A set of new measures of consistency, contradictoriness, and triviality of a set of formulas have been defined. These have then been put to use in an example to show that this framework can provide better means of machine reasoning.

math.LO