How to Protect Your Privacy? A Framework for Counter-Adversarial Decision Making

Abstract

We consider a counter-adversarial sequential decision-making problem where an agent computes its private belief (posterior distribution) of the current state of the world, by filtering private information. According to its private belief, the agent performs an action, which is observed by an adversarial agent. We have recently shown how the adversarial agent can reconstruct the private belief of the decision-making agent via inverse optimization. The main contribution of this paper is a method to obfuscate the private belief of the agent from the adversary, by performing a suboptimal action. The proposed method optimizes the trade-off between obfuscating the private belief and limiting the increase in cost accrued due to taking a suboptimal action. We propose a probabilistic relaxation to obtain a linear optimization problem for solving the trade-off. In numerical examples, we show that the proposed methods enable the agent to obfuscate its private belief without compromising its cost budget.