arXiv · 2004.06185
Correlated equilibria and mean field games: a simple model
Abstract
In the context of simple finite-state discrete time systems, we introduce a generalization of mean field game solution, called correlated solution, which can be seen as the mean field game analogue of a correlated equilibrium. Our notion of solution is justified in two ways: We prove that correlated solutions arise as limits of exchangeable correlated equilibria in restricted (Markov open-loop) strategies for the underlying $N$-player games, and we show how to construct approximate $N$-player correlated equilibria starting from a correlated solution to the mean field game.
Explore related subjects
Keep this discovery
Luciano Campi, Markus Fischer. 2020-04-13. Correlated equilibria and mean field games: a simple model. https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.06185
Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.