arXiv · 2007.04388
Continuity and sensitivity analysis of parameterized Nash games
Abstract
In this paper we consider continuity of the set of Nash equilibria and approximate Nash equilibria for parameterized games. For parameterized games with unique Nash equilibria, the continuity of this equilibrium mapping is well-known. However, when the equilibria need not be unique, there may exist discontinuities in the equilibrium mapping. The focus of this work is to summarize continuity properties for parameterized Nash equilibria and prove continuity via the approximate Nash game with uniformly continuous objective functions over potentially non-compact strategy spaces.
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Zachary Feinstein. 2020-07-08. Continuity and sensitivity analysis of parameterized Nash games. https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.04388
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