SearcharxivSearch

arXiv · 2011.13696

Use the Spear as a Shield: A Novel Adversarial Example based Privacy-Preserving Technique against Membership Inference Attacks

Abstract

Recently, the membership inference attack poses a serious threat to the privacy of confidential training data of machine learning models. This paper proposes a novel adversarial example based privacy-preserving technique (AEPPT), which adds the crafted adversarial perturbations to the prediction of the target model to mislead the adversary's membership inference model. The added adversarial perturbations do not affect the accuracy of target model, but can prevent the adversary from inferring whether a specific data is in the training set of the target model. Since AEPPT only modifies the original output of the target model, the proposed method is general and does not require modifying or retraining the target model. Experimental results show that the proposed method can reduce the inference accuracy and precision of the membership inference model to 50%, which is close to a random guess. Further, for those adaptive attacks where the adversary knows the defense mechanism, the proposed AEPPT is also demonstrated to be effective. Compared with the state-of-the-art defense methods, the proposed defense can significantly degrade the accuracy and precision of membership inference attacks to 50% (i.e., the same as a random guess) while the performance and utility of the target model will not be affected.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

BibTeXRIS

Mingfu Xue, Chengxiang Yuan, Can He, Zhiyu Wu, Yushu Zhang, Zhe Liu, Weiqiang Liu. 2020-11-27. Use the Spear as a Shield: A Novel Adversarial Example based Privacy-Preserving Technique against Membership Inference Attacks. https://doi.org/10.1109/tetc.2022.3184408

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Empirical Evaluation of Membership Inference Attacks on NLP Text Classifiers: A Baseline Study on SST-2

Membership inference attacks (MIAs) try to determine whether a specific record was used to train a model, a privacy risk that matters in natural language processing (NLP), where training data can contain sensitive user text. This paper presents a controlled benchmark of membership inference vulnerability for text classification on the GLUE SST-2 sentiment dataset. A TF-IDF + Logistic Regression pipeline and a fine-tuned DistilBERT classifier are compared under a loss-threshold MIA, with utility measured by development accuracy and macro F1. DistilBERT reached 0.9466 accuracy and 0.9460 macro F1 against 0.8756 and 0.8727 for Logistic Regression, yet both models leaked membership signal (Attack AUC 0.5615 and 0.5800, respectively). Two mitigations were tested. Stronger regularization reduced leakage for Logistic Regression at a visible utility cost, whereas fine-tuning DistilBERT for 2 epochs instead of 3 reduced leakage with negligible accuracy loss. Lightweight training adjustments can improve the privacy-utility trade-off without complex defenses.

cs.CR

Empirical Evaluation of Data Poisoning Attacks in Supervised Learning

Data poisoning corrupts training data to degrade a model or to plant attacker-controlled behavior. This study evaluates two representative training-time attacks, label flipping and backdoor poisoning, on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST with three baseline classifiers: Logistic Regression, Linear SVM, and Random Forest. Clean training is compared with poisoning rates of 5%, 10%, and 20% using clean-test accuracy, macro-precision, macro-recall, macro-F1, and, for backdoors, attack success rate. Label flipping caused clear degradation, largest for Logistic Regression and Linear SVM, while Random Forest stayed comparatively stable. Backdoor poisoning reached attack success rates from 0.9667 to 1.0000 on both datasets and all three models while often keeping clean-test performance near baseline. The results separate indiscriminate poisoning, which shows up in standard metrics, from targeted backdoor poisoning, which stays comparatively stealthy while embedding highly effective malicious behavior, and they support security-oriented evaluation beyond conventional clean-test metrics.

cs.CR

DeFiFusion: Combining Transaction Events with Smart Contracts to Detect Price Manipulation Attacks

Decentralized Finance (DeFi) has emerged as a rapidly growing blockchain-based financial service, where market transaction dynamics and underlying smart contract logic are intricately intertwined. This autonomous interplay, while eliminating centralized intermediaries, significantly expands the vulnerability surface of DeFi protocols to Price Manipulation Attacks (PMAs), which have already inflicted catastrophic financial losses. Despite their gravity, existing detection paradigms suffer from fundamental limitations. Transaction-centric methods lack awareness of contract execution semantics, making them prone to false positives under legitimate market volatility, while static contract analyses ignore real transaction behaviors and frequently report vulnerabilities that are infeasible to exploit in practice. We present DeFiFusion, a dual-modal PMA detection framework that closes this gap by jointly modeling transaction events and smart contract semantics within a unified pipeline. Our core insight is that PMA maliciousness emerges only from the interaction between transaction behaviors and the contract logic they exploit; neither signal suffices in isolation. Accordingly, we derive price-manipulation-aware event encoding for extracting fine-grained temporal and economic features tailored to manipulation patterns. We further introduce LLM-based contract semantic extraction to supply the execution-logic context that prior behavioral methods lack. To fuse these modalities, we propose a Dual-Modal Projection-Fusion Transformer with T5-style relative positional encoding, capturing the cyclic multi-stage execution structures that distinguish PMAs from benign market activity. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DeFiFusion consistently achieves state-of-the-art detection performance, effectively recalling 222 of the 225 PMA cases while maintaining a precision of 96.10%.

cs.CR