arXiv · 2108.06498
A Verification Theorem for Stackelberg Stochastic Differential Games in Feedback Information Pattern
Abstract
This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg stochastic differential game on a finite horizon in feedback information pattern. A system of parabolic partial differential equations is obtained at the level of Hamiltonian to give the verification theorem of the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium. As an example, a linear quadratic Stackelberg stochastic differential game is investigated. Riccati equations are introduced to express the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, analytical and numerical solutions to these Riccati equations are discussed in some special cases.
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Qi Huang. Jingtao Shi. 2021-08-14. A Verification Theorem for Stackelberg Stochastic Differential Games in Feedback Information Pattern. https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.06498
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