arXiv · 2109.04226
Incentivizing an Unknown Crowd
Abstract
Motivated by the common strategic activities in crowdsourcing labeling, we study the problem of sequential eliciting information without verification (EIWV) for workers with a heterogeneous and unknown crowd. We propose a reinforcement learning-based approach that is effective against a wide range of settings including potential irrationality and collusion among workers. With the aid of a costly oracle and the inference method, our approach dynamically decides the oracle calls and gains robustness even under the presence of frequent collusion activities. Extensive experiments show the advantage of our approach. Our results also present the first comprehensive experiments of EIWV on large-scale real datasets and the first thorough study of the effects of environmental variables.
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Jing Dong, Shuai Li, Baoxiang Wang. 2021-09-09. Incentivizing an Unknown Crowd. https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.04226
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