SearcharxivSearch

arXiv · 2109.06739

Set theory and a model of the mind in psychology

Abstract

We investigate the mathematics of a model of the human mind which has been proposed by the psychologist Jens Mammen. Mathematical realizations of this model consist of so-called \emph{Mammen spaces}, where a Mammen space is a triple $(U,\mathcal S,\mathcal C)$, where $U$ is a non-empty set ("the universe"), $\mathcal S$ is a perfect Hausdorff topology on $U$, and $\mathcal C\subseteq\mathcal P(U)$ together with $\mathcal S$ satisfy certain axioms. We refute a conjecture put forward by J. Hoffmann-J{\o}rgensen, who conjectured that the existence of a "complete" Mammen space implies the Axiom of Choice, by showing that in the first Cohen model, in which ZF holds but AC fails, there is a complete Mammen space. We obtain this by proving that in the first Cohen model, every perfect topology can be extended to a maximal perfect topology. On the other hand, we also show that if all sets are Lebesgue measurable, or all sets are Baire measurable, then there are no complete Mammen spaces with a countable universe. Finally, we investigate two new cardinal invariants $\mathfrak u_M$ and $\mathfrak u_T$ associated with complete Mammen spaces and maximal perfect topologies, and establish some basic inequalities that are provable in ZFC. We show $\mathfrak u_M=\mathfrak u_T=2^{\aleph_0}$ follows from Martin's Axiom, and, contrastingly, we show that $\aleph_1=\mathfrak u_M=\mathfrak u_T<2^{\aleph_0}=\aleph_2$ in the Baumgartner-Laver model.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

BibTeXRIS

Asger Törnquist, Jens Mammen. 2021-09-14. Set theory and a model of the mind in psychology. https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.06739

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

There is no maximal $K$-degree

The Kolmogorov complexity of a string characterize how complex it is to describe the string. If every prefix of a real $x$ is more complex to describe than every prefix (of the same length) of real $y$, then it is seen as $x$ is more complex to describe than $y$. It is wondered if there is a real $x$ so that no other reals are strictly more complex (to describe) than $x$. The behavior of Kolmogorov complexity functions generated by reals (namely $n\mapsto$ the minimal description length of the real) is quite chaos. Therefore, it is widely believed that there are many reals that are maximally complex to describe. For instance, it is conjectured that all random enough reals have maximal $K$-degree. In this paper, it is shown that there is no real with maximal $K$-degree. Actually, for almost all real $x$, we can uniformly computably find another real whose $K$-degree is strictly above $x$.

math.LO

Quadruples and cubes

We prove, in $\mathsf{ZFC}$, that the $\lambda$-terraced cube relation fails whenever $\lambda$ is an uncountable cardinal. The corresponding terraced relation for quadruples fails for every $\lambda$. If $\lambda$ is $\aleph_0$ then the pretinent terraced relation has consistency strength of at least one Woodin cardinal. We prove positive polarized relations at a successor and a double successor from wondrous ideals. We show, however, that there are no such ideals over two consecutive cardinals simultaneously.

math.LO

Possibilistic Logic over a Logic of Formal Inconsistency

In this article, we have introduced a new possibilistic logic on a logic of formal inconsistency with the aim of developing a possibility theoretic framework to deal with uncertainty and inconsistency meaningfully without leading to a system collapse. We have discussed the syntax and semantics for this logic and have proved the soundness and completeness theorems. A set of new measures of consistency, contradictoriness, and triviality of a set of formulas have been defined. These have then been put to use in an example to show that this framework can provide better means of machine reasoning.

math.LO