arXiv · 2110.00362
Dynamics of targeted ransomware negotiation
Abstract
In this paper, we consider how the development of targeted ransomware has affected the dynamics of ransomware negotiations to better understand how to respond to ransomware attacks. We construct a model of ransomware negotiations as an asymmetric non-cooperative two-player game. In particular, our model considers the investments that a malicious actor must make in order to conduct a successful targeted ransomware attack. We demonstrate how imperfect information is a crucial feature for replicating observed real-world behaviour. Furthermore, we present optimal strategies for both the malicious actor and the target, and demonstrate how imperfect information results in a non-trivial optimal strategy for the malicious actor.
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Pierce Ryan, John Fokker, Sorcha Healy, Andreas Amann. 2021-10-01. Dynamics of targeted ransomware negotiation. https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2022.3160748
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