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arXiv · 2110.10556

One Instrument to Rule Them All: The Bias and Coverage of Just-ID IV

Abstract

We revisit the finite-sample behavior of single-variable just-identified instrumental variables (just-ID IV) estimators, arguing that in most microeconometric applications, the usual inference strategies are likely reliable. Three widely-cited applications are used to explain why this is so. We then consider pretesting strategies of the form $t_{1}>c$, where $t_{1}$ is the first-stage $t$-statistic, and the first-stage sign is given. Although pervasive in empirical practice, pretesting on the first-stage $F$-statistic exacerbates bias and distorts inference. We show, however, that median bias is both minimized and roughly halved by setting $c=0$, that is by screening on the sign of the \textit{estimated} first stage. This bias reduction is a free lunch: conventional confidence interval coverage is unchanged by screening on the estimated first-stage sign. To the extent that IV analysts sign-screen already, these results strengthen the case for a sanguine view of the finite-sample behavior of just-ID IV.

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BibTeXRIS

Joshua Angrist, Michal Kolesár. 2021-10-20. One Instrument to Rule Them All: The Bias and Coverage of Just-ID IV. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2022.12.012

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