arXiv · 2208.04341
On the Role of Quantum Communication and Loss in Attacks on Quantum Position Verification
Abstract
We study the role of quantum communication in attacks on quantum position verification. In this work, we construct the first known example of a QPV protocol that is provably secure against unentangled attackers restricted to classical communication, but can be perfectly attacked by local operations and a single round of simultaneous quantum communication indicating that allowing for quantum communication may break security. We also show that any protocol secure against classical communication can be transformed into a protocol secure against quantum communication. We further show, using arguments based on the monogamy of entanglement, that the task of Bell state discrimination cannot be done locally with a single round of quantum communication, not even probabilistically (when we allow attackers to say loss sometimes), making this the first fully loss-tolerant QPV task secure against quantum communication attacks. Finally, we observe that any multi-round QPV protocol can be attacked with a linear amount of entanglement if the loss is high enough.
Explore related subjects
Keep this discovery
Rene Allerstorfer, Harry Buhrman, Florian Speelman, Philip Verduyn Lunel. 2022-08-08. On the Role of Quantum Communication and Loss in Attacks on Quantum Position Verification. https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.04341
Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.