arXiv · 2208.11425
Absorbing Blackwell Games
Abstract
It was shown in Flesch and Solan (2022) with a rather involved proof that all two-player stochastic games with finite state and action spaces and shift-invariant payoffs admit an $\epsilon$-equilibrium, for every $\epsilon>0$. Their proof also holds for two-player absorbing games with tail-measurable payoffs. In this paper we provide a simpler proof for the existence of $\epsilon$-equilibrium in two-player absorbing games with tail-measurable payoffs, by combining recent mathematical tools for such payoff functions with classical tools for absorbing games.
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Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, János Flesch, Eilon Solan. 2022-08-24. Absorbing Blackwell Games. https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.11425
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