arXiv · 2210.01610
Exit game with private information
Abstract
The timing of strategic exit is one of the most important but difficult business decisions, especially under competition and uncertainty. Motivated by this problem, we examine a stochastic game of exit in which players are uncertain about their competitor's exit value. We construct an equilibrium for a large class of payoff flows driven by a general one-dimensional diffusion. In the equilibrium, the players employ sophisticated exit strategies involving both the state variable and the posterior belief process. These strategies are specified explicitly in terms of the problem data and a solution to an auxiliary optimal stopping problem. The equilibrium we obtain is further shown to be unique within a wide subclass of symmetric Bayesian equilibria.
Explore related subjects
Keep this discovery
Explore connections, maps & timelines
H. Dharma Kwon, Jan Palczewski. 2022-10-04. Exit game with private information. https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.01610
Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.